Introduction

Antigone and the Poliethical Life

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Yo sé bien que cuando el mundo/Cede, lúvido, al descanso,/Sobre el silencio profundo/Murmura el arroyo manso.

(I well know that when the world/yields, livid, to rest,/over the profound silence/the gentle brook murmurs).

—José Martí, Yo soy un hombre sincero

[El lenguaje funda la moral . . . no hay forma de hablar de ética en serio si no se atiende al significado de las palabras.]

(Language establishes moral . . . there is no way to talk about ethics seriously if we do not pay attention to the meaning of words).

—Francisco Fernández Buey, Politètica

Certainly among the most fascinating characters found in Greek tragedy—Phaedra, Clytemnestra, Electra—Antigone has received bountiful attention from philosophers, writers, and scholars. The myth of Antigone is trans-historical, that is, it travels across history, not outside it. “Myth is a type of speech,” observes Roland Barthes in Mythologies (217). It is, Barthes argues, “a type of speech chosen by history” (218). Myth’s “nature,” he finally contends, is its historical determination (245). However, Antigone’s myth has not always been mediated by history; it has also been rewritten instead in ways that disavow its specific sociohistorical mediations. “In passing from
history,” Barthes consequently observes, “myth abolishes the complexity of human acts, it gives them the simplicity of essences, it does away with all dialectics, with any going back beyond what is immediately visible” (256). This passing is actually carried out in “a background that is already depoliticized, and, thus, already naturalized” (256). The versions of the myth of Antigone collected here flesh out this tragic myth in its historical determinations. (In this volume Jordi Ibáñez-Fanés explicitly studies Luis Riaza’s version of Antigone by means of a Barthesian point of view.) These historical determinations are intimately related to both politics and ethics. Yet neither of them—neither politics nor ethics—is reducible to the other, but rather they are conjugated and articulated together. Indeed, in classical antiquity politics and ethics were understood in a relationship of intimate reciprocity, as I will argue later.

Various are the accounts of the myth of Antigone that exist in modern and contemporary Latin American and Iberian literatures. Whose Voice is This? Iberian and Latin American Antigones addresses how different accounts of the myth of Antigone represent and embody historical, cultural, and political events in modern and contemporary Spain, Portugal, Latin America, and the Hispanic Caribbean. By reclaiming Walter Benjamin’s reflections in his “Theses on the Philosophy of History” about the task of the historian and the critic as one who seeks to “blast a specific era out of the homogenous course of history” and to “grasp the constellations which his own era has formed with a definite earlier one” (263), this volume seeks to address how these Antigones trace historical constellations as well as discontinuities with earlier epochs.

My contention is that a structural articulation of constellations and discontinuities in history and culture are constitutive of the transatlantic. Some of the recent theorizations on transatlantic studies—specifically in the fields of Iberian and Latin American studies—resonate with this argument. Transatlantic studies has been understood as a theoretical conceptualization that studies the relations between and circulations of discourses, and how these interactive forms affect both sides of the Atlantic. Likewise, the way in which ideas, horror, and aesthetics circulate within the Atlantic, mainly in dictatorial regimes, has been proposed as central to transatlantic studies. Ideas, horror, and aesthetics represent both continuities and ruptures in different regimes and historical contexts in Latin America, the Hispanic Caribbean, and the Iberian Peninsula. For the specific horrors that have taken place on both sides of the Atlantic return in a different but not entirely dissimilar way. Continuing with this critical stance, in recent years the character of “the vanquished” and the concept of “defeat” have been conceptualized as central categories of transatlantic studies. All in all, the sociocultural history that is at the core of transatlantic studies “inaugurates a transatlantic memory” that has an impact on the present. To the foregoing discussion, I would like to emphasize the critical import of
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historical mediations, in their continuities or discontinuities, for the field of transatlantic studies.

One fundamental transatlantic connection—among many others—is the fact that the colonial emancipation in the Americas constituted a process that was not only American, but also European. It was intercontinental (Anderson 33). For instance, one twentieth-century manifestation of a transatlantic historical constellation is Augusto Pinochet’s 1973 coup d’état in Chile against the three-year government of Salvador Allende, which led to an extremely authoritarian and brutal regime that lasted until 1990. This took place near the end of Francisco Franco’s long dictatorship in Spain. Moreover, not only was Pinochet a great admirer of Franco, but Pinochet also appeared, several times, on the cover of the pro-regime magazine Fuerza Nueva (New Force), whose subtitle was “dios o patria o justicia” (god or homeland or justice) (see fig. 1). Additionally, when Spain was beginning the transition to democracy, a 1976 military coup in Argentina led to the dictatorial regime of Jorge Rafael Videla, which lasted until 1983.

Apropos of these transatlantic connections, in his Transatlantic Fascism Federico Finchelstein notes that the rise of fascism (I would say authoritarianism in the case of Spain) in Europe decreased, but did not diminish the power of the metaphor of civilization and barbarism in the development of attitudes and policies toward and in Latin America (passim). Reversals, continuities, and discontinuities unfolded across the Atlantic. Hence the totality of these constellations finds expression in the ways in which Antigone functions as a unifying, yet hardly univocal figure.

The idea of constellations and discontinuities that structures this volume is informed by both Walter Benjamin’s and Theodor W. Adorno’s theorizations about history. Benjamin famously reflects about a “structural principle’ that opens up spaces of differentiation by means of which ‘salvation’ in history is possible” (Vázquez-Arroyo 455). Like Benjamin, Adorno articulates a strong critique of narratives of history in which history is understood as a telos of progress. Indeed, while Adorno was deeply indebted to Benjamin’s work, he offered a formulation of history by means of dialectical thinking. In a way, Adorno’s theorizations are a recasting of Benjaminian reflections embedded in a more sustained dialectical narrative of history. His reflections on history sought to dialectically and conceptually apprehend both the constellations and discontinuities (which Benjamin calls spaces of differentiation) in concrete historical realities. At stake in these conceptualizations is, as Vázquez-Arroyo argues, a theorization of “the differentiation of history in which the critical dislocation and unity of discontinuity and continuity, . . . [that] cements historical experiences, [which is] perhaps the most crucial element in the history of defeat and possibility that [Benjamin] theses as a whole argue for, demands a dialectical rendering of history and progress” (455–56). With this volume I propose that the proliferation of artistic narratives about the character of Antigone that have emerged in the last sixty years of the
twentieth century (and the beginning of the twenty-first) might be productively approached by considering the historical constellations and discontinuities—both as spaces of similarities and as spaces of differentiation and ruptures—that exist in a transatlantic history.

This proliferation of narratives depicts in multifarious forms the ways in which writers have faced the different structures of violence and power that led to the destruction of a twentieth-century political utopia: socialism, along with equality and democracy, in the Iberian Peninsula, the Hispanic Caribbean, and Latin America. Hence, the different narratives of Antigone’s tragedy perform imaginary responses to the question of how to live and think both politically and ethically when facing the perversion and obliteration of the abovementioned utopias. Accordingly, the essays included here focus on issues of historical memory, military dictatorships and democracies, conceptions of justice outside of the frame of the positivistic side of law, and the human condition in predicaments of violence, all of which are at the center of current debates in the aforementioned countries. Accordingly, these essays have been grouped as Latin American Antigones, Hispanic Caribbean Antigones, Iberian Antigones, and, using Becky Boling’s words in her essay for this volume, “intertextual uses” of Antigone.

David Wiles has pointed out that within the Western tradition, it was the Greeks who invented political theory, theater, and democracy. Political theory, for its part, at once conceptualizes the relations between theater and democracy and finds expression in Greek tragedies. Moreover, as Wiles observes, in Ancient Greece theater helped to nurture the demos in critical judgment and civic values that form the basis for political life (passim). It is along these lines that theater for Hannah Arendt in The Human Condition is the political art par excellence, while the civil obligation of society is “the point at which we decide whether we love the world enough to assume responsibility for it, and by the same token save it from that ruin which, except for renewal, except for the coming of the new and young, would be inevitable” (193). This is what I understand as an ethics of responsibility. Against this political, cultural, and material ruin, the character of Antigone raises the multifarious voices she acquires across the Atlantic not only to speak about different forms of loss: the loss of her brother and the loss of a public, political space, but also to articulate and defend both the denizen’s civic rights and rights of life. As in Sophocles’ Antigone, in the variations of the myth in Latin America, the Hispanic Caribbean, and the Iberian Peninsula, these rights are inaccessible to Antigone. However, as the enduring insurgent she has always been, the Antigone portrayed in these essays continue to stand against forms of power and the domination of life, that is, against modalities of sovereign power (understood as power without accountability) and the rule of law that portend absolute supremacy and perpetuity, and that enter into the spectrum of what is understood as a “state of exception.” Here the state of exception is understood as a legal structure that nations can declare
when they identify what they call “moments of national danger or crisis.” This legal structure entails a union between legality and illegality; in other words, an existing law is suspended so a different, law-less space legitimately emerges. The violence of the state of exception is frequently rationalized by means of a rhetoric of the nation’s well-being and security, and is perpetuated and reproduced by its legal institutions. This establishes forms of power and exclusion that, on the one hand, lead to a lack of responsiveness to pain or to superfluous suffering for other human beings, which, therefore, eschews an ethical acknowledgment of the vulnerability of human life. This vulnerability, I aver, is historically and politically constituted. On the other hand, these forms of power and exclusion annul the liberty of expression and destroy any form of human communicability because they seek to eradicate any possibility of political participation. The law of silence, which is a law paradoxically legitimized by language, achieves such a prohibition of expression and communication.

**Contestable Representations, or Antigone’s Plurality of Voices**

“Then I would have you keep watch over my words” (20), orders Creon to the city’s denizens in Sophocles’ *Antigone*. As is well known, after a civil war in Thebes, in which the brothers Eteocles and Polynices die, Creon enforces a decree that prohibits both burial and mourning for the “traitor” brother, Polynices. Yet the legitimacy of Creon’s decree depends not only in the denizens’ obedience, but also in that they watch over his words. Apropos of obedience in Sophocles’ *Antigone*, Moira Fradinger observes that in the play “the verb ‘to obey’ appears . . . [as] the extremity of being under the yoke, being forced, and [as] listening, being persuaded, trusting” (*Binding Violence* 62). What is implicit in Creon’s words—and his request for obedience—is the state of surveillance they create among the city’s denizens, and the prolongation of his discourse of punishment. His words create an aberrant form of peace in the polis. Is it possible, then, to disregard the power of Creon’s words, namely, the power of his language? The sharing of words and deeds, Arendt suggests, are constitutive of the political. This means, I suggest, that in the formation of the political there is a transitive relationship between language and action. Still, what Creon’s words actually do is obliterate the political, for they point to the suppression of any form of collective power. Indeed, they create a false—and perverted—form of collectivity. Both his words and deeds render powerless the city’s denizens. Hence, for the denizens to recuperate a form of power, and the right to the political, implies making the power of words and actions also their own, as Antigone does:

CREON. [t]ell me briefly, not at length: did you know
it had been announced not to do this?
ANTIGONE. I did. Why would I not know? It was clear.
CREON. And yet you dared to overstep these laws? (29)  

Antigone not only clearly declares that she defies the decree of an unjust ruler, but she also affirms to her sister Ismene: “He [Creon] has no right to keep me from my own” (15). Indeed, Antigone asks Ismene: “Will you share in the labor and the deed?” (14), “Will you lift the corpse with this very hand?” (15). Antigone is asking Ismene to share deeds and words in order to act politically. But Ismene, like the other denizens, is terrified by Creon’s force. Yet by burying Polyneices, Antigone not only acts, but she also speaks; not only crosses the wall that encloses the city, and thus disobeys, but also breaks silence.  

Since then, in her innumerable personifications, Antigone has been crossing many borders and questioning Creon’s language to create her own. In this sense, Antigone’s voice, using Adriana Cavarero’s vocabulary, is a voice that “does not mask but rather unmasks” (24). This makes us think about the female prisoners in José Martín Elizondo’s Antígona entre muros—studied in this volume by Verónica Azcue—in which the prisoner-actresses will both act and recuperate their language in their theatrical representation of Sophocles’ Antígona within the cell. In fact, Martín Elizondo’s play, José Bergamín’s La sangre de Antígona and María Zambrano’s La tumba de Antígona—the latter analyzed here by Juan Herrero-Senés—constitute the Antigones of the Republican exile of 1939. Indeed, Zambrano conceived Antigone as an allegory of exile.  

In her multifarious forms, Antigone recuperates the political. But what about the ethical? This volume is concerned with the interrogation of the complex—and sometimes vexed—relationship between ethics and politics. Actually, the drama of Antigone was understood by Simone de Beauvoir, as Sonia Kruks has observed, as the quintessential expression of two conflicting positions: moral idealism, which is what Antigone represents, and political realism, which is what Creon represents (170). Does the ethical mean that one should refuse to act (171)? This is the question that informs Beauvoir’s reflections about the conundrum of the linkage between ethics and politics. The tragedy of Antigone, affirms Beauvoir, “appears as the ancient symbol of a conflict that continues to this day . . . while being contemptuous of earthly goods, [Antigone] proclaims the necessity of certain eternal principles” (175), namely, burying her brother Polyneices. Meanwhile, Creon knows that virtue is “poorly rewarded,” and that is why “only force reigns supreme” (176). What follows from such dissimilar positions, argues Beauvoir, is not simply that between Creon and Antigone “understanding is not possible” (177), but that the union between ethics and politics seems to be impossible as well. And yet Beauvoir does not deny that for this union to crystallize, “ethics and politics must attain a clearer consciousness
of themselves” (177). I contend that this is a consciousness that crystallizes in both the myth and the character of Antigone. Antigone shows that ethics—as well as politics—does have a hold in the world. Indeed, this complex connection is what articulates Antigone’s responsibility to Polyneices, and the city’s denizens. Contrary to Beauvoir, I would not say that her acts are guided by moral idealism. For Antigone’s ethics is not the ethics of conviction (e.g., as an ideal of virtue or as the conviction of salvation in the Christian sense, among others) but rather the ethics of responsibility: she responds both to the city’s collective well-being and to Polyneices as a vulnerable human being, whose corpse is the product of a predicament of violence. For this reason Antigone’s responsibility is both political responsibility and responsibility for human beings.

In several versions of Antigone’s tragedy, the ethical consists in the significance given to notions of vulnerability and recognition within predicaments of violence. This importance has been articulated in epistemological terms on some occasions, and at other times in ontological terms. In the latter philosophical point of view one should include Guillem Colom’s Majorcan Antígona (1935), whose aim was, as Jordi Malé observes, “showing the exemplarity of Antigone’s behavior from a Christian perspective,” in which the notion of “piety” is central to define Antigone’s deeds. Colom’s Antígona, claiming Barthes’s assertions about myths, takes place against a background already depoliticized, and therefore naturalized. Moreover, if we understand piety as devotion to God, to religious practices, and as a sort of “sacrifice in sublime passivity for the other”—using Gillian Rose’s vocabulary—and, thus, dissociated from the political, I ask with Rose, what is the sociopolitical constituent that piety prevents human beings from understanding (43)? Does piety preclude an understanding of human vulnerability as historically and politically constituted by predicaments of violence?

In connection with this discussion, it is important to remember that Barthes warns us that myth is “the most appropriate instrument for the ideological inversion” (255), something that resonates with José María Pemán’s Catholic Antígona (1945). The publication date of Pemán’s Antígona has multiple sociopolitical underpinnings: the end of World War II, which begins when the Spanish Civil War ends. In Spain, six years of the most brutal period of the Franco regime have already passed. Pemán was a pro-Franco regime writer, so it is not surprising that his dramatic piece “was not presented as a direct reference to the Civil War” (Azcue 34-35). In a very conspicuous formulation regarding Pemán’s Antígona, Azcue observes, “La adaptación de José María Pemán elegía un tema y argumento de interés sociopolítico: . . . sacava a relucir la política de los enteramientos de los muertos de la Guerra Civil, el anonimato y el olvido de las fossa communes” (36) (The adaptation of José María Pemán chose a topic and argument of sociopolitical interest: . . . it brought to light the politics of mass burials
of the Civil War, anonymity, and the neglecting of the mass graves). But this sociopolitical interest (which might also be ethical, for it is concerned with the fate of the human body) is suspiciously mediated by the celebration of victory in Pemán’s dramatic piece. The critical importance of the tragedy—if indeed there was truly any—was too oblique, thus veiled by “la importancia plástica y sonora otorgada a la victoria” (Azcue 36) (the plastic and sonorous importance given to victory). In this way, it leaves the abovementioned sociopolitical concerns hanging within a huge, ongoing question mark: the bodies and mass graves of whom? Clearly the issue at stake is Franco’s mass burials and historical memory in Spain. Ultimately, we cannot afford not to mention Bergamín’s La sangre de Antígona. His dramatic piece emphasizes the existential interrogation on how to find a dwelling in the world after a civil war:

TIRESIAS. Antígona no debe morir. Si matáis su amor en vuestro corazón mataréis en vosotros a todos los hombres.

ANTÍGONA. ¡Ay de mí! . . . . Sola entre los vivos y los muertos. Mis palabras se apagan con sus sombras. Mi alma se consume, derriba, sin impetu, sin vuelo, caída al empuje de la pena, vencida por esta mortal pesadumbre . . . . ¿Por qué vivo? ¿Por qué doy la vida? . . . . ¿Por qué morir? ¿Para quién? (24–25).

(TIRESIAS. Antigone must not die. If you kill her love in your heart you will kill in you all men.

ANTÍGONA. Alas! . . . . Alone among the living and the dead. My words fade away into their shadows. My soul is consumed, downhearted, with no impetus, with no flight, fallen by the force of sorrow. Defeated by this deadly grief . . . . Why do I live? Why do I sacrifice my life? . . . . Why die? For whom?)

Through Tiresias’s words, Bergamín bestows upon Antigone a universal quality of redemption. A further instance that shows how Antigone is a character that stimulates these philosophical reflections (meaning the epistemological and the ontological perspectives) is the tension and entwinement between the body politic and the human body studied by Cavarero in her essay “On the Body of Antigone.” All in all, what notions of vulnerability and recognition have in common in several variations of this Greek tragedy is that they acquire material significance—that is, they stop being empty signifiers—by being understood within a critical ethos and a political impulse that challenge violence, and, therefore, pay attention to both human subjectivity and the fragility of human beings when confronted with predicaments of violence, which are both historically and politically constituted.

Notwithstanding all of the above, the question remains: why Antigone in the twenty-first century? I propose that one of the main
reasons is that her myth points to the interrogation of the concept of justice simplistically and poorly understood as a principle of "impartiality," as well as this concept’s identification with discourses of security and punishment. Moreover, confirming Fanny Söderbäck’s interrogations in “Why Antigone Today?” another reason may be that her figure—which is bestowed with multiple significations—tells us something about the possibility of the redefinition of the political as such in a moment of global crisis (1). I would argue that there is a historical constellation here, since there have been previous significant moments of global crises (the First and the Second World Wars and the long decade of the Great Depression, among others). Even so, I would recast Söderbäck’s assertions. I believe that global crises do not provoke the need for a “redefinition of the political,” as she argues, even when in fact the present global crisis makes us wonder about the legitimacy and adequacy of the specific political form of our epoch—which is liberal democracy—and the ways of life that it has enacted. On the contrary, I believe that global crises were and are exacerbated by political struggles that are entrenched in existing forms of power that eschew possible alternative political forms in order to gain or preserve political power. Hence I ask, rather than the “redefinition of the political,” would it not be more necessary to interrogate political power itself? In this sense I ask: what is it that the figure of Antigone interrogates about power and the rights of life?

Antigone tells us about politics and depoliticization, about collective power and the obliteration of the collective, about ethics and the reification of ethics. Certainly she tells us something about the import—and weight—of recuperating a political voice. In this spirit, some of the main questions of this volume are: how does the present political (global) crisis relate with past political crises? In how many ways does Antigone traverse both these temporalities as well as the broad geographical space of the Atlantic? And, in so doing, what other things—ideas, realities, discourses, etc.—might she potentially transport and signify? Antigone, for instance, is the epitome of different forms and conceptions of death; she, indeed, has had many deaths. And yet, as Fradinger observes in “Nomadic Antigone,” “She is indefatigable [and nomadic] as all the undead seem to be” (15). It is this “indefatigable undead” that has made her reborn as an exile. Her figure creates a ghosting: something that appears again, but in different contexts (Carlson 7). Actually, the “undead” is not merely the reappearance of Antigone, but rather the enduring defense of the rights she has always claimed: the right to life, the right to occupy a public space, and the right to the political, which are articulated and materialized by language. This is, I propose, Antigone’s legacy.

Facing forms of power and exclusion that both monopolize and entirely obliterate public life demands a form of political ethics, which is exactly what, more often than not, I believe, the figure of Antigone has come to allegorize. Concerning the importance of language for both
politics and ethics, the Spanish philosopher Francisco Fernández Buey coined the concept of *política* (poliethical) to refer to “[la] pluralidad de éticas y [la] fusión de lo ético y lo político” (32) (the plurality of ethics, and the fusion between the ethical and the political). The classic conceptualization of ethics and politics, Fernández Buey affirms, is Aristotle’s *Nicomachean Ethics*. The concerns of ethics are goodness, happiness, virtue, friendship, and justice. On the other hand, the topics of politics are the analysis of the civil community and constitutions, the diverse kinds of regimes, the analysis of what constitutes a well-governed city, and education (Fernández, *Ética y filosofía política* 19). Ethics, accordingly, is the reflection on the life of human beings within society. Meanwhile, politics refers to the life of human beings in the polis; therefore its object is the collective (Fernández, *Ética y filosofía política* 20). Despite these clear differences, ethics and politics are interrelated insofar as the life of human beings also depends on the ways the polis is constituted (Fernández, *Ética y filosofía política* 21). In fact, scholars agree that it is only in classical antiquity where the union of ethics and politics is understood as central for democracy. Therefore, this Greek notion of politics—amended by the Athenian democracy—might be translated as follows: “La política es la ética de la vida colectiva” (Fernández, *Ética y filosofía política* 21) (Politics is the ethics of collective life). In Beauvoir’s words, the moral is conceived as an abstract, absolute, and timeless precept of ethics that dominates and imposes itself in life and society. Hence the central issue of a wounded *ético-político* conscience in the twentieth century, Fernández Buey explains, was not a concern with goodness, but rather the issue of what could be characterized as the “order of evils.” From this wound stems the interrogation of the persistence of the order of evils, which not only manifests in exploitation and oppression, but also in the misery and misfortune of those who have to deal with more than just pain and suffering after two World Wars, the Spanish Civil War, and subsequent dictatorships.

This is what Lukács called “tragedia de lo ético” (qtd. in Fernández Buey, *Política* 29–30) (the tragedy of the ethical). This notion of the tragedy of the ethical resonates with Antón Arrufat’s “Antígona”—here studied by Ashley Puig-Hertz—in that the poem is a reflection on the human condition and humanity’s difficulty finding a dwelling in contexts of unending violence. Hence a poliethics emerges precisely when the human condition has been in great danger (Fernández Buey, *Política* 29–30). But in this poliethics, which has been proposed as an ethics of collectivity, language is fundamental. For in order to create a politics that also is an ethics of collectivity, it is crucial to pay attention to language, to the meanings of words as well as their perversion, uses, and abuses (Fernández Buey, *Política* 29–30). It is precisely the women, the widows of Ariel Dorfman’s dramatic piece—analyzed here by Moira Fradinger—who have disappeared, who create a poliethical collectivity by the structure of
interlocution they have decided to occupy, which instates the demand for the political.

In *Ética y Política* (Ethics and Politics) the Spanish ethicist José Luis Aranguren offers another point of view of the relationship between ethics and politics. He proposes four possible ways of thinking and living this relationship within modernity: (1) “realismo político” (political realism), in which the moral is considered as a negative idealism, detrimental for politics; (2) “la repulsa de lo político” (the rejection of the political), conceived as unfavorable to the primacy of the moral; (3) “la concepción trágica” (the tragic conception) of the political, in which the cohesion of ethics and politics simultaneously seems to be a necessity and an impossibility, thus producing a split human being that finds itself in the position of having to respond to both the moral exigency and the unavoidability of the political; (4) “la concepción dramática” (the dramatic conception) of the political, where the relationship between ethics and politics becomes a “búsqueda incesante” (an enduring quest) as well as permanent tension and relentless self-criticism (Aranguren qtd. in Fernández, *Ética* 32–33). Aranguren rejected the first two and preferred the two remaining conceptualizations, but he specifically defended the dramatic conception of the political. For Fernández Buey, however, the tragic and the dramatic conceptions are rather difficult to separate, for he finds a profound bond between them. That initial difference between the tragic and the dramatic linkages of ethics and politics, he observes, “se difumina bastante para el intelectual que es consciente de lo que es la política, y a la vez atento de lo ético” (*Ética* 33) (fades for the intellectual that is conscious of what politics actually is, while is also aware of the ethical). Here I want to reclaim Beauvoir’s assertions mentioned above. The tragic and the dramatic view of the ethical and the political, Fernández Buey asserts, are rather two emphases of the intrinsic problematic of this linkage, which is historically variable in the life of human beings (*Ética* 33). Accordingly, the union between the ethical and the political is a “desideratum” that emerges in epochs in which people need both to share political power, and have rights of life in contrast to their complete debarring under dictatorial rule and oligarchic forms of politics, or with the liberal and neoliberal political forms of the present.23 The latter—which is the form that exists in our present—also constitutes the age of the extreme political manipulation of the people (Fernández Buey, *Política* 32). For this reason, a poliethical reflection is necessary. Indeed, it is necessary when the language that refers to and articulates the foregoing social relations does not change and remains the kind of language that forms discourses of censorship, vigilance, exclusion, sacrifice, and punishment.24 For instance, one of the most prominent aspects of Salvador Espriu’s *Antígona* (1939) is the poetic power of silence, which reverberates powerfully in relation to the contrasting views of the two central characters of the play, Antigone and Creon. For Creon there is only a
single and supreme good: his univocal idea of justice, which is expressed in his decree (Duprey 220). Hence a poliethical approach that aims to create an ethics of collective power and life should pay attention to the adulteration of words, to the adulteration of language. Apropos of the necessary awareness of language, in “The Power of Words” Simone Weil affirms that in order to clarify thought it is necessary to discredit intrinsically meaningless words, and, hence, use other words—other language—in order to rescue analysis (270–71.)

Taking the aforesaid into account, in order for the union between politics and ethics to create an actual poliethical collectivity, it is indispensable to have a critical awareness of the words—the language—that have been reified, such as political, ethics, peace, victory, community, democracy, or power, among others. Certainly, Antigone’s tragedy not only questions perverted forms of “the political,” but also interrogates authoritarian forms of politics in their different guises. Nevertheless, the political—and in a more expansive meaning, political life—cannot be equated with violence and coercion, but rather needs to be conceived in relationship to a robust sense of politics and political life that have to do with the plurality of human beings, with the possibility of words and action, and with the protection of human life under politically constituted practices and institutions anchored on values of equality, freedom, and justice. Accordingly, an important aspect of a poliethical reflection of society and culture is recognizing human beings both as potential political subjects, and also in their finitude and vulnerability. I understand the notions of finitude and vulnerability as human attributes that are mediated by historical and social processes, with cultural and political dimensions. Hence, as Judith Butler asks, the question that is at stake here is, “Who is Antigone within such scenes, and what are we to make of her words? . . . . She is not of the human, but speaks in its language” (150). Even so, Butler overlooks an important nuance: that there is not only one form of human language. It is about both recuperating the power to speak another (human) language, and the power to act.

This emphasis on human language certainly resonates with Louis Althusser’s striking assertion about the Church and the Word: “La Iglesia vivirá por aquellos que por la lucha y en la lucha misma, redescubren que la Palabra ha nacido entre los hombres y ha vivido entre los hombres, y que le dan [los seres humanos a la Palabra] un lugar humano entre los hombres” (qtd. in Cerutti 252) (The Church will live by those that for the fight and the fight itself, rediscover that the Word was born among men, and have lived among men, and that [human beings give to the Word] a human place among men). Actually, Althusser’s emphasis on “human language” within history has been associated with liberation theology in Latin America, which is at the core of Becky Boling’s essay for this volume. Liberation theology, Horacio Cerutti explains, “puede verse como un paso . . . en el camino de los cristianos hacia su reconciliación con el mundo y con la historia . .
. . asumiendo sus culpas y criticándolas, en tanto que ser cristiano implica cargar con una tradición de conquista y explotación en América, avanzando hacia un compromiso auténticamente revolucionario” (186) (can be seen as a step . . . in the path of Christians toward reconciliation with the world and history . . . accepting their faults and criticizing them, for being a Christian means bearing a tradition of conquest and exploitation in America, moving towards a truly revolutionary commitment). Definitely, liberation theology’s concerns are both ethical and political.25 Without a doubt, for a pro-Franco regime writer, like Pemán, liberation theology must have been a fundamental threat to the faith of the Catholic Church and to the Franco regime, most probably for its “radically Marxist positions.”26 This theology not only understands the political option as the conscious acceptance of a collective commitment with a politics of liberation that is socially grounded, but it also is interested on recuperating history—that is, human history (Cerutti 187, 478). It is a human history that can only be lived, claiming Alejo Carpentier’s literary reflections, in “el reino de este mundo” (the kingdom of this world). Indeed, in Carpentier’s El reino de este mundo (1949) (The Kingdom of this World) a description of Ti Noël, the character that links together the narrative continuity of the novel, conjures an awareness of time and history:

Ti Noël . . . era un cuerpo de carne transcurrida. Y comprendía, ahora, que el hombre nunca sabe para quién padece y espera . . . . Pero la grandeza del hombre está precisamente en querer mejorar lo que es . . . . En el Reino de los Cielos no hay grandeza que conquistar, puesto que allá . . . todo es existir sin termino . . . . Por ello . . . el hombre sólo puede hallar su grandeza, su máxima medida en el Reino de este Mundo. (135)

(Ti Noël . . . was a body flesh to which things have happened. Now he understood that a man never knows for whom he suffers and hopes . . . . But man’s greatness consists in the very fact of wanting to be better than he is . . . . In the Kingdom of Heaven there is no gradeur to be won, in as much as there . . . exitence is infinite . . . . For this reason . . . man finds his greatness, his fullest measure, only in the Kingdom of this World.) (de Onís 178–179)

Apropos of history and power, and the meaning and measure of the human being within it, in Persona y democracia—written in 1958, during the heyday of the most brutal phase of Francisco Franco’s regime—the Spanish philosopher María Zambrano asserts that a democratic politics is bound to a very specific determination: the abandonment of what she calls “la historia sacrificial” (93) (sacrificial history). For Zambrano, a sacrificial history is a history that fails because of its own teleological idea of progress and, therefore, where it is not possible to live as a human being. A sacrificial history, she adds,
is “el momento en que la historia es simplemente un crimen multiplicado alucinatoriamente” (93) (the time when history is a crime hallucinatorily multiplied). With the adjective “sacrificial,” Zambrano specifically points to those sociopolitical projects that were obliterated and shattered in the past (e.g., democracy, autonomy, independence, plurality, or equality) by dictatorial and authoritarian regimes that ended up destroying a sense of the right to the political. By eliminating, for instance, plurality and equality, as well as an actual political life, a sacrificial history does not equate with democratic politics or the practice of democracy. For Zambrano the abandonment of the sacrificial history, that is, the abandonment of multiplied crimes in history, would only define a democratic politics and the practice of democracy, all of which entails a non-sacrificial perspective of politics. Actually, all the Antigones portrayed in this volume—echoing Zambrano’s words—“are stained by different forms of crimes” (93). Still, they are also marked by metaphors of life and instances of reflection that, while only existing as words, may be transformed into action.

The courageous deeds of Oedipus’s daughter, who has always been and felt as a foreigner, travel. And by traveling, Antigone acquires different guises and different voices that correspond to the specific parts of the Atlantic to which she has been called. Traveling, in Edward Said’s words, necessarily involves processes of representation different from those at the point of origin (226). These Antigones, then, do not represent fixed political or ethical meanings, for the ossification of these meanings—that is, the ossification of the political or the ethical—would obliterate them. Antigone’s acts are thus narrated in Leopoldo Marechal’s Antígona Vélez; Ariel Dorfman’s Viudas; Griselda Gambaro’s Antígona furiosa; Luis Rafael Sánchez’s La pasión según Antígona Pérez; Antón Arrufat’s “Antígona;” Franklin Domínguez’s Antígona-Humor; María Zambrano’s La tumba de Antígona; Luís Riaza’s Antígona… ¡cerda!; José Martín Elizondo’s Antígona entre muros; Antes que a Noite Venha, the Portuguese variation of the tragedy by Eduarda Dionísio; as well as in the Catalan adaptations of the tragedy, such as Antígona by the Majorcan poet Guillem Colom; La tragèdia d’Antígona by Joan Povill Adserà, and the Antigones written by Salvador Espriu, Muñoz Pujol, Romà Comamala, Pere Alberó, and Jordi Coca. And, ultimately, the intertextual uses of Sophocles’ tragedy in Carlos Gené’s Golpes a mi puerta. In their own ways, the essays included in this volume address the question formulated in 1980 by Maria del Carme Bosch in the conclusion of her essay “Les nostres Antígones” (Our Antigones): “[e]ns resta preguntarnos en nom de quina abstracció, en nom de quina reivindicació d’aquí en endavant alçarà la seva veu i donarà la seva vida Antígona?” (111) ([w]e should ask ourselves in the name of what abstraction, in the name of what vindication from now on will Antigone raise her voice and sacrifice her life?). For Sophocles’ Antigone is the origin, but not necessarily the beginning.
In “Leopoldo Marechal’s Antígona Vélez and the Symbolic Landscapes of Peronism,” Brenda Werth argues that Marechal’s adaptation of Sophocles’ Antigone may be interpreted most productively in the urban context of Buenos Aires, where the contradictory impulses behind Peronist cultivation of a discourse of social inclusion and uniformity, on the one hand, and a rigid “us” versus “them” rhetoric, on the other, played out in spectacular fashion. For Werth, the city of Buenos Aires, as a centerpiece of Peronist identity and contested space, reveals alternative interventions that when read against Marechal’s landscapes of inclusion and exclusion make evident the dissonance between theatrical metaphors of national uniformity and real claims of difference and dissent enacted in the space of the city.

With “In the Wake of Tragedy: Citation, Gesture, and Theatricality in Griselda Gambaro’s Antígona furiosa,” Patrick Dove focuses on the relation between memory and history in Southern Cone cultural production, which can be understood in the context of two transitions taking place in the 1980s and 1990s—from political violence and repressive military dictatorship to representative democracy, and the neoliberal state of privatization and financial speculation—in order to explore how Gambaro appropriates Greek tragedy as a framing device for her reflections on dictatorship, state terrorism, and resistance, while at the same time raising questions about literature’s capacity to reckon with the wounds of history. In her essay “Demanding the Political: Widows or Ariel Dorfman’s Antigones,” Moira Fradinger suggests that Dorfman’s play, which is persistently read in the context of the dramatization of the process of the recovering of historical memory, stages a specific claim: the reestablishment of a different, very specific memory: the memory of the political. Dorfman’s Widows, she argues, bring about this reestablishment by depicting the historical context of the militarization of the political field, or its neutralization. According to Fradinger, only in the restoration of the political would the politics of memory that scholars have emphasized actually emerge.

“Archiving Antigone on the Puerto Rican Stage: Luis Rafael Sánchez’s La pasión según Antígona Pérez” is Katherine Ford’s reflection on why in twentieth-century Puerto Rican literature there is a need to return to the ancient Greek stage and to the myth of Antigone in order to convey new perspectives on how this return enriches this literary canon. Ford also examines how Luis Rafael Sánchez uses the past to innovatively understand the present and point to the future. In doing so, she shows how Sánchez borrows from the myth of Antigone in order to have access to an established theatrical and literary tradition of the Western canon, and yet he innovates this story in such a way that it stages the multiplicity and particularity of Latin American identities. In “Broken Treasures, Invincible Solitude: Silence, Absence, and Time in Antón Arrufat’s ‘Antígona,’” Ashley Puig-Herz fleshes out Antón Arrufat’s elaboration on memory, the body, and the relationship human beings have with the material objects (cosas) that surround them. Her
essay offers an initial examination of this neglected Cuban Antigone, while shedding light on Arrufat’s early vision of both Cuban society and of broader questions of history and the human condition. In “Social and Political Criticism: The Reformulation of the Myth of Antigone in Franklin Domínguez’s Antígona-Humor,” Martha Bátiz Zuk argues that Franklyn Domínguez’s Antígona goes beyond what has been wrongly understood as a merely sympathetic and well-armed moraleja, since the author’s deep knowledge of the Dominican idiosyncrasies and weaknesses of its bourgeoisie are evident in the creation and development of the characters in what has been labeled as a politically unengaged Antígona. In contrast, Bátiz argues that Domínguez unmask his people and laughs about them to call attention to serious social and political issues behind what she calls the “deceptive lightness” of the play; namely, the historical moment in which it was created and staged: the Dominican Civil War of 1965, along with U.S. military intervention and the widespread repression that marked the twelve years of Balaguer regime, which was a troubled and violent moment in the recent history of the Dominican Republic.

“María Zambrano: Appropriation and Transfiguration of Antigone” is Juan Herrero-Senés’ reflection on three conditions that configured what he calls a “triple transit” in María Zambrano’s text: “implementation,” “appropriation,” and “transfiguration.” Implementation entails a displacement from the nonfictional reflection, the essay or the treatise, to a dramatic form, which is organized based on the dialectical relations among the characters in a specific environment and predicament. Appropriation refers to the adoption and conscious rewriting of specific Western protagonists and mythic plots, with their antagonisms and symbols. Transfiguration means the translation of the individuality and the personal biography of Zambrano in her creatura Antígona in the form of the allegory of exile. Herrero-Senés argues that with this transposition Zambrano’s Antígona actualizes a thought that seeks to fuse the individual with the collective, the temporal with the mythic. Hence Zambrano simultaneously speaks about her and her experience, about human beings and the history of twentieth-century Spain, in which the experience of exile becomes an aspect that establishes a lineage: the lineage of those unjustly dispossessed of their space, of their dwelling in the world.

“From the Tomb to the Prison Cell: José Martín Elizondo’s Antígona entre muros” is, first, Verónica Azcue’s exploration of how the tragedy of Antigone emerges forcefully in Spain following the Spanish Civil War and continues throughout the Franco dictatorship. Second, while specifying that, as with other myths, the evocation of the figure of Antígone in Elizondo’s play is motivated by a specific sociopolitical context, that of post-Civil War Spain, Azcue also fleshes out what is distinctive in Elizondo’s play, namely that the reemergence of Antígone is conditioned by the imposition of censorship and the expression of the exiles’ condition. On this last point, Azcue reminds readers that
Elizondo’s version of the tragedy of Antigone has an affinity with the versions of the myth created by María Zambrano and José Bergamín. Meanwhile, Jordi Malé ponders the two spaces in which the tragedy of Antigone has been placed in the context of the modern and contemporary Catalan culture—between religion and politics—in his essay “Catalan Antigones: Between Religion and Politics.” Malé sketches a brief history of the Catalan Antigones that have been associated with Christianity and the reinterpretation of Antigone’s actions in light of Christian values, and of those that, in contrast, have been interpreted from a mainly political perspective involving the city and the polis as a whole.

In the essay “Antigone’s Long Shadow: Myth, Politics, and Memory in Democratic Spain,” Jordi Ibáñez-Fanés suggests that the figure of Antigone might help to understand the contradictions and weaknesses of Spanish democracy. For it is a myth that works like a mirror: it shows the weight of Franco’s legacy and how it is embedded in institutions as well as the difficulties of entwining private memories of sorrow with public politics of democratic euphoria and voluntarism. In this vein, Ibáñez-Fanés reads Luis Riaza’s Antígona…¡cerda! as an expression of this contradiction by exploring how Antigone becomes an allegorical character of the weaknesses of the Spanish democracy. Whereas a myth is hardly to be understood in a general sense, without a concrete textual base for interpreting it, for the author of this essay, it is also possible to speak of a myth in the way proposed by Roland Barthes: as a semiotic constellation with ideological functions. Accordingly, there are two main vectors articulated in his essay: a general Barthesian way of interpreting the myth, and a textual analysis of the myth in Riaza’s play. With “Female Voice/Male Perspective: The Uneasy Task of Revisiting Cultural Image Repertoire in Antes que a Noite Venha,” Ines Alves Mendes proposes that in Antes que a Noite Venha, Eduarda Dionísio systematically pays attention to women’s corporeality and experiences while avoiding the trap of fixing femininity within the limits of an essentialized category. Accordingly, Alves Mendes explores the strategies Dionísio uses in order to convey a new cultural figuration for Antigone, while fleshing out the imposed limitations of her work, which was commissioned by the actor/director Adriano Luz. Alves Mendes illustrates, for instance, how Dionísio and Luz’s joint work was mutually contradictory. While Dionísio created moments of resistance, which led to a redefinition of the stabilized cultural heritage and gender normativity, Luz sought to maintain what Alves Mendes understands to be the established.

Lastly, in her essay “Intertextual Uses of Antigone and Liberation Theology: The Passion of Ana in Juan Carlos Gené’s Golpes a mi puerta,” Becky Boling elucidates how Juan Carlos Gené reimagines Sophocles’ Antigone through the lens of liberation theology and recasts her myth within that theology’s practices and rituals, which are closely related to the political and social milieu of late twentieth-century Latin
America. The predicaments of the Greek Antigone, violence and justice for instance, unfold in Gené’s Golpes a mi puerta within the influence of liberation theology, which makes the play a dramatic space for the expression of both the ethical and the political.

Finally, I would like to propose that the variations of the tragedy of Antigone gathered together in this volume encompass a multiplicity of voices that confer upon her figure a dialogical attribute in the sense suggested by Mikhail Bakhtin: as the representation of “all the sociological and ideological voices of [an] era” (411), which these Antigones embody, and of “all the languages that have any claim to be significant” (411). Herein dialogism also concerns a plurality of voices and narratives that is opposed to the univocal narrative of the myths of the nation and national unity that were erected in the Hispanic Caribbean, Latin America, and the Iberian Peninsula, an opposition that may weaken the force of the political narratives that have power today. The former is a plurality that more often than not was sacrificed when the future of the national unity was considered to be “at risk.” The latter is related to liberal and neoliberal values that, as Nick Couldry observes, “have been implemented as the principle for social and political organization” (47). The voice—the poliethical voice—might upset these forms of political and social organization, as Couldry proposes (47), as well as the language, I argue, that discursively establishes them. In this sense the poliethical voice might undermine the reification of language as both objectification and alienation. The foregoing also recalls Bakhtin’s notions of centripetal and centrifugal linguistic forces. The former points to political and ideological centralization, the latter to “uninterrupted processes of decentralization and disunification” (272). Antigone’s centrifugal voice and language intersect—using Bakhtin’s vocabulary—Creon’s utterance in its multiple expressions and contexts. Antigone has already begun an unending crossing of the Atlantic, and by refusing to remain in the context of univocal narratives and the status quo, as well as in forms of violence and exclusion by acting and speaking, Antigone’s voices in both sides of the Atlantic are enduringly disruptive.

To conclude, I would like to suggest that Antigone, in her multiple versions, guises, personifications, and images, signifies the dramatic conception of the political proposed by Aranguren, in which the bond between the ethical and the political is an enduring quest, a tension, and a permanent interrogation. Hers is a permanent interrogation of what has been established as foregone or as infallible justice and truth. For let us not forget that, as the Greek Antigone affirms to Creon, “it wasn’t Zeus who pronounced these things to me, nor did Justice, companion of the gods below, establish such laws for humanity.”

Notes
INTRODUCTION

1. This Greek tragedy has been rewritten in a variety of ways and has elicited important reflections from the Greeks on. Among the themes explored by means of this tragedy, one finds theoretical and political reflections about the family, the state, the intersections between natural and civil law, kinship, and incest. Some of its explorations in the Western tradition are G.W.F. Hegel’s reflections in his *Phenomenology of the Spirit* and his *Aesthetics*; Jacques Lacan’s psychoanalytic interpretation of Antigone, as explored in his *Book VII: The Ethics of Psychoanalysis*; Judith Butler’s innovative reflections on the myth in her book *Antigone’s Claim: Kinship Between Life and Death*; Slavoj Žižek’s appropriation of Lacan’s discussion of Antigone in *The Metastases of Enjoyment*. Likewise, more recently Slavoj Žižek and Alain Badiou organized a symposium whose central question was, “What if Antigone were a refugee?” It is worth mentioning that though Badiou certainly pays attention to the figure of Antigone, in his *Theory of the Subject* he has a sort of diatribe regarding what he calls the “Sophocles Paradigm,” and proposes to move to what he terms the “Aeschylus Paradigm.” For a full discussion of Badiou’s juxtaposition, see Bosteels. Lastly, in his book *En el umbral de Antígona. Notas sobre la poética y la narrativa de José Revuelta*, José Manuel Mateo interprets the literary work of the Mexican writer via the myth of Antigone, which is proposed as a cultural intersection of the aesthetic proposal of Revueltas’ literary work. By reconfiguring the motif of the unburied body, Mateo proposes that Revueltas makes us interrogate not only the subject’s potential inhumanity, but also communist bureaucracies and democracies that, by allowing torture and disappearance, persecution of political dissidents, and constant vigilance on human existence, have become partners in both crime and impunity.

2. See Pérez del Solar and Fernández de Alba.
3. See Enjuto-Rangel and Martín Cabrera.
4. See Amar Sánchez.
5. See Ortega.
6. Democracy “(Demos + cracy) signifies rule by the people and contrasts with aristocracy, plutocracy, oligarchy, tyranny, and also with a condition of being colonized or occupied.” See Brown, “We Are All Democrats Now” (2).
7. I understand the political as “much more than administrative governance.” See Wolin.
8. In contrast with an ethics of conviction, which tends to abstractions, absolutes, and false universals. For a fuller account of this distinction, see Beauvoir.
9. For the different meanings of the notion of sovereignty, see Brown.
10. For an extensive discussion on the state of exception, see Schmitt and Agamben.
11. With regard to the relationship between words and acts I am interested in the political intuition Arendt has about what is constitutive of the political. In other writings, in contrast, Arendt not only speaks of words and acts, but also of the importance of great speeches for the constitution of the political. For a fuller discussion, see Wolin.
12. The emphasis is my own.
13. In the Harvard Classics edition of Sophocles’ *Antigone*, Antigone’s responsibility toward the dead is more clearly – and solemnly – conveyed: “Wilt thou with me go forth to help the dead?” she asks Ismene (244).
14. In the Greek *Antigone* the chorus talks about the danger of the pride of both Creon and Antigone that overlooks their own human finitude.
15. For a fuller discussion, see Aznar Soler.
16. It is important to note that at the beginning of her essay Simone de Beauvoir conceives Antigone as the prototype of a stubborn moralist, in order to expose an antagonistic relation between ethics and “political realism.” At the end of the essay her arguments are more nuanced. All in all, one should not forget that...
Beauvoir’s essay corresponds to an epoch in which the disaster of the Second World War wounded an *ethico-political* conscience.

17. For a fuller discussion, see Jerez-Farrán and Amago, and Layla Renshaw.
18. The emphasis in italics is my own.
19. It is worth noting that in my use of the term “voice,” I make the distinction between voice as *phonē* (merely sound, which all living species have) and voice as *logos*, where the potentiality for the political resides. See *Cambridge Dictionary of Philosophy*.
20. For a fuller discussion see, Sedgwick and Eagleton. It is worth noting that there existed a sort of union between ethics and politics during the Renaissance. As Nancy S. Struever explains, “The primary Renaissance innovation consisted in the switching of attention to the practices of inquiry to theory as practice. In inventive Renaissance ethics, there is a concern with what constitute proper moral work, as suppose to the simply iteration of moralism” (xi). A sort of union between ethics and politics during this period is articulated, thus, in the “relocation of inquiry” to practice.
21. For an extensive discussion of the meaning or structure of the “order of evils,” see Adi Ophir’s *The Order of Evils*.
22. Fernández Buey observes that this preoccupation for language and its linkage with ethics was already a concern in the first decade of the twentieth century.
23. In the latter the political structure of this sharing does not go beyond universal suffrage and an illusion of political representation.
24. In its original meaning in Greek, Fernández Buey explains, being a *zoon politikon* means forming part of a social species that has also *logos* (logos); namely, reasoned word; it means forming part of a social species whose members are nurtured both spiritually and individually through social communication. They also feel the obligation—not in the sense of guilt, but rather of responsibility—to actively participate in the control and administration of the public good in order to reach personal happiness (*Ética y filosofía política* 28).
25. Precisely because of this particular stance, in his *Preliminary Notes on Liberation Theology* (1984), then-Cardinal Joseph Ratzinger affirms that liberation theology “does not wish to develop new aspects of the Church’s social ethics. Rather it sees itself as a new hermeneutics of the Christian faith.”
26. Also at the beginning of his *Preliminary Notes*, Ratzinger affirms, “Liberation theology is a phenomenon with an extraordinary number of layers. There is a whole spectrum from radically Marxist positions, on the one hand, to the efforts which are being made within the framework of a correct and ecclesial theology, on the other hand, a theology which stresses the responsibility which Christians necessarily bear for the poor and oppressed, such as we see in the documents of the Latin American Bishops’ Conference . . . from Medellín to Puebla. In what follows, the concept of liberation theology will be understood in a narrower sense: it will refer only to those theologies which, in one way or another, have embraced the Marxist fundamental option.”

Works Cited

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Fig. 1. Pinochet with King Juan Carlos on the cover of the magazine New Force (May 1977)